Three reaction time (RT) experiments using a modified Sternberg procedure were conducted to determine the number of memory representations maintained for perceptual (dot-pattern) concepts. The difference in RT to test stimuli from memory sets of different sizes was used to infer whether one, or more than one, memory representation was utilized for the perceptual concepts. It was concluded that multiple specific representations are utilized in early stages of experience with stimuli but that a single generic representation serves to represent the concept information after moderate amounts of experience.
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Three reaction time (RT) experiments using a modified Sternberg procedure were conducted to determine the number of memory representations maintained for perceptual (dot-pattern) concepts. The difference in RT to test stimuli from memory sets of different sizes was used to infer whether one, or more than one, memory representation was utilized for the perceptual concepts. It was concluded that multiple specific representations are utilized in early stages of experience with stimuli but that a single generic representation serves to represent the concept information after moderate amounts of experience.
One of the current issues in research on visual pattern recognition and perceptual concept learning concerns the number and type of memory representations that are established and maintained to represent perceptual concepts (e.g., Charness & Bregman, L973; Peterson, Meagher, Chait, & Gillie, 1973; Posner & Keele, 1968; 1970; Reitman & Bower, 1973; Strange, Keeney, Kessel, & Jenkins, 1970) . The three panels of Figure 1 illustrate three major possibilities that have been proposed for the fomr of the memory representations within a single concept. Alternative a indicates that only representations of the specific experienced exemplars might be stored in memory. Alternative b reflects the possibility that after experiencing several exemplars from a particular concept a single generic rnemory representation is developed or constructed that serves to represent the entire concept.
It should be emphasized tl,at the distinction between Alternatives a and b in Figure 1 is based primarily on the issue of whether concepts have only one, or have more than one, representation in memory. The single representation, referred to here as the generic representation, may be either the prototype of the concept, an attribute frequency compilation, a single "best" exemplar, or something else. The important characteristic is that in this alternative the concept has only a single representation in memory. The multiple representations of Alternative a are presumably individual memory representations of each exemplar from the concept that have been presented to tl-re subject. The third panel of F-igure 1, Alternative c, illustrates the possibility that both of the alternatives discussed above are correct. That is, upon experiencing several exemplars from a concept the subject might have stored both representations of specific exemplars as illustrated in Alternative a and a generic representation characteristic of the concepts as a whole, as illustrated in A1-ternative b.
The three experiments in the current article were designed to distinguish between Alternatives a and b of Figure 1 . The technique used to assess the number of concept representations maintained in memory was based on the well-documented empirical result that for conceptually distinct stimuli such as letters and digits the reaction tin.re (RT) to decide whether a test stimulus is one that had been presented before is positively related to the number of stimuli in the earlier presented memory set. Although this result has been the source of a great deal of theoretical speculation and its precise interpretation is still a source of great contro-
St imuli
Ge ner ic Spec if ic \.ersy (e.g., Sternberg, I974), the general finding of increased RT with increased set size is sufficiently robust to allow its use as a tool for investigating the number of representations maintained in memory. Specifically, the procedure of these experiments involved contrasting the difference in RT between memory sets of two sizes for letter stinruli, which are conceptually distinct, to the difference in RT between memory sets of two sizes for clot-pattern stirnuli, in which all of the items in a particular memory set rvere frorn the same concept.
The logic of the comparison is that if there is a difference in ItT between the large and the sn-rall n-remory sets with the letter stimuli but no difference with the dot-pattern stimuli, then one could infer that the lnemory representations for the dot-pattern concepts are independent of the number of exemplars and therefore are probably unitary. On the other hand, if there is no interaction of stimuli with set size, and both the letter and the clot-pattern stimuli result in greater RTs with increased set size, then one could infer that there are multiple specific representations for each dot-pattern concept.
Experiment 1 l'I ethod Subjects. Five college students of both sexes participated in four sessions of approximately 90 min. each. All subjects were tested individually.
Sthnuli and apparatus. The dot-pattern stimuli lvere very similar to those described in earlier (cl "{i>", studies (e.g., Peterson et al., 1973; Posner, Goldsmith, & Welton, 1967) and, consisted of nine 3.7-bit distortions of four prototype patterns of nine dots each. Photographic slides were made of each pattern, rvith black lines around the outer borders to indicate the effective boundaries of the pattern. Photographic slides were also made of the 20 consonants of the alphabet in their uppercase forms.
The slide stimuli used for the memory set stimuli were arranged in blocks of two or six in a Kodak Carousel slide projector under the control of the subject. The slide stimuli used as the test probe stimuli were arranged in a tray in front of the experimenter for easy placement into another slide projector that was connected to an arrangement of timers and clocks. This second slide projector was controlled by a timer that initiated an RT clock, accurate to the nearest millisecond. The RT clock was stopped by a response of the subject on one of the two response keys located in a panel in front of him. The lcft key was to be pressed if the test slide rvas not one of those seen in the memory set, and it was consequently labeled iliferenl, whereas the right key was to be pressed if the test slide was one of those seen in the memory set, and thus it was labeled, samcThe test probe stimuli rvere arranged such that one half of the trials, selected randomly, should result in a positive (same) response and one half in a negative (different) response. As nearly as possible in the number of trials available, all stimuli within each memory set were presentecl equally often.
The procedure with the dot-pattern stimuli was difierent from that vvith the letter stimuli in three respects. First, all of the dot-pattern stimuli within the same memory set were related, since they were all exemplars from the same concept. The letter stimuli within the memory sets had no internal relationship. Second, the rule governing a positive (same) response for the dot-pattern stimuli was altered to include any stimulus (exemplar) from the same concept as that presented in the memory set and not just the particular exemplars actually presented. And third, one half /i), , Table 1 . mirrored the RT data in nearly all respects (i.e., errors increased as RT increased and vice versa) and will not be discussed further.
The RT data (from all trials and not just from correct trials) were subjected to sevlral analyses. The first was based on the mean RTs for clusters of 18 trials each. These data were entered into an analysis of variance with subjects (five levels), stimuli (dot patterns or letters), set size (two or six), and practice (eight levels) as factors. The error term in this analysis was the mean squares of the four-way interaction of Subjects X Stimuli X Set Size X Practice (MS": 3,823.02). The following effects were found to be statistically significant: snbjects, F(4,28)= I87.66, / < .0001; stimuli, F( l, 28)= 452.50, p < .0001 ; set size, F(1, 28)= 43.82, / < .0001; practice, F(2, 28)-17.77, / < .0001. The patterns of the main effects as well as the interactions can be seen illustrated in Figure 2 . Note that letter stimuli were responded to more rapidly than dot-pattern stimuli, that twoitem memory set stimuli were responded to more rapidly than six-item memory set stin-ruli, and that there was a reduction in RT with increased practice. Perhaps the most interesting result, however, is the interaction of stimuli with set size, indicating that the dot-pattern stimuli do not exhibit the trend evident in the letter stimuli for RT to be slower with increased memory set size. Also of interest is the interaction of stimuli with practice, which indicates that the dotpattern stimuli exhibit greater reductions in RT with increased practice than the letter stimuli. It is worth noting, however, that even in the last data point the RT to the dot-pattern stimuli is not at the level of the RT to the letter stimuli.
Another interesting feature of the data illustrated in Figure 2 is that the RTs to the Ietter stimuli replicate almost exactly the findings of Sternberg and others using the plpdigm he developed (e.g., Sternberg. 1974) , For example, the average difference of the trials lequiring a positive response involved new exemplars from the same concepts presented in the memory set, and one half of the oositive trials involved old exemplars that had bein presented in the memory set.
Procedure. Within each session the subject received either the dot-pattern stimuli or the letter stimuli for two blocks of 72 RT trials. A trial consisted of the following events: (a) The experimenter instructed the subject to advance the slide projector the proper number of slides; (b) the subject inspected each memory set slide for as long as desired; (c) the subject informed the experimenter that he was ready for the test slide; (d) the experimenter presented the test slide for I sec; (e) the subject responded; and (f) the experimenter gave the subject time and accuracy feedback. The subject received one set of stimuii with Set Size 2 (or 6) on the first trial, a second set of memory stimuti with Set Size 6 (or 2 ) on the second trial, a third set of memory stimuli with Set Size 2 (or 6) on the thiri trial, and a fourth set of memory stimuli with Set Size 6 (or 2) on the fourth trial. After the fourth trial the sequence of memory stimuli was repeated in the reverse order, and this alternation process continued for nine cycles to reach 72 trjals.
No two subjects were treated in exactlv the same fashion in this experiment. Three suL3".t. received the letter stimuli on the first and fourth sessions and the dot-pattern stimuli on the second and third sessions, and the other two subjects received the stimuli in the reverse order. Three subjects started the sequence of trials with a twoitem memory set trial and two started it with a six-item memory set trial. And finally, three subjects received a particular dot-pattern concept or group of letters as a two-item memory set, whireas the other two subjects received that dot-Dattern concept or that group of letters along with other additional letters as a six-item memory set. Whichever set size was assigned to a particular dotpattern concept or group of letters for a subject remained unchanged tlroughout all experimental trials for that subject. between the six-item RT and the two-item RT is I27 msec, a value that leads to an estimate of 32 msec per item in the memory comparison phase of Sternberg's model. Other estimates of this parameter have typically ranged from 30 msec per item to 45 msec per item (e.g., Sternberg, 1974) . Also consistent with many previous results is the finding that the difference between the two set sizes was nearly identical for positive (658 vs. 534 msec) and negative (683 vs. 567 msec) responses.
Although the Stimuli X Set Size X Practice interaction was not statistically significant, F(7,28)= l.$1, P > .05, the first data point in Figure 2 suggests that the Stimuli X Set Size interaction might not be evident at the very early stages of practice. To test this possibility, the data from the first 18-trial cluster were segmented into nine twotrial groups, and an analysis of variance similar to that described above was conducted on these data. Note that since there were two sets of stimuli with each set size, this segmentation of the data results in each two-trial group representing RT performance on each successive experience with the concepts. In other words, tht RTs are averaged only across the two different sets of stimuli with the same set size and not across successive experiences with the same stimulus sets.
The results of this second analysis of variance with the four-way interaction as the error term (MS" = 126,710.49) were as follows: statistically significant effects of subjects, F (4, 32) = 24.05,2 < .0001 ; stimuli, F(1, 32)-99.74,2 <.0001; and practice, F(8, 32)-3.45, p < .0L; but no effect of set size or of any interactions among stimuli, set size, or practice. The lack of a main effect of set size or of an interaction of set size with stimuli, even though these factors were statistically significant in the analysis of the complete set of data, suggests either that the determinants of these effects are not effective early in practice or that the variability was so great as to preclude their detection.
A third analysis was based only on the data from the positive trials with the dot-pattern stimuli to determine whether there were any differences in RT to olcl exemplars and new exemplars from the learned concepts. Mean RTs were computed for the old exemplars and the new exemplars for each block of 18 trials, and these values entered into an analysis of variance with subiects (five levels), exernplar type (old or new), set size (two or six), and practice (eight levels) as factors. As in the earlier analvses. the four-way interaction ternr was used as the crror term for all con-rparisons (MS. = 13,050.22). The following effects provecl to lre statistically significant : subjects, F (4, ZB) :152.93, p < .0001; exemplar type, F(l,28) : 11.56, p < .005; and practice, F(7,2g)= 56.56, p < .0001. Neither the main effect of set size nor any of the interactions anong exemplar type, set size, and practice were significant. The direction of the exemolar effect was for new exemplars to have longer RTs than old exemplars (i.e., 812 vs. ZSj msec).
Discussi.on
The major result from this experiment is the interaction between stimulus type and set size. Increasing the menrory set size from two to six results in a large increase in RT for the letter stimuli (i.e., 541 to 668 msec) but aln.rost no increase for the dot-pattern stimuli (i.e., 811 to 814 msec). According to the argun-rent proposed earlier, this result may be taken as evidence that the number of rnemory representations maintained for a dot-pattern concept is not related to the number of exemplars presented from that concept. It is therefore reasonable to infer that a single generic representation seryes as the memory representation for perceptual concepts.
Whether the form of the memory reDresentations evolves from multiple speciic representations to a single generic representation with increased exDerience is difificult to assess from these data. The greater RT with the six-item set size than with the two-item set size in the first data point with the dot-pattern stimuli is consistent witl-r such an evolution. However, the statistical results lead to somewhat contra dictory conclusions. On the one hand, in the analysis of all of the data the Stimuli x Set Size interaction was statistically significant and the Stimuli X Set Size X Practice interaction was not, thus suggesting that the same Stimuli X Set Size interaction pattern existed through all stages of practice. On the other hand, the Stimuli X Set Size interaction was not significant in the analysis of the data from only the first 18 trials, therebv indicating that the Stinruli X Set Size inteiaction was not evident in the earliest stages of practice. IJnfortunately, interpretations of these findings are hampered by a relativell, large degree of variability at the earliest stages of practice. In an atter.npt to obtain more precise estimates of the effects earlv in practice, another experiment was designerJ with a larger number of subjects.
Experiment 2
The purpose of this experin.rent was the same as that of Experin.rent 1, that is, to determine the number of memory representations maintained for perceptual concepts, but with a concentration on the subiect's initial 12 experiences with the stimuli. To simplifv the task and reduce the time n"."rr"ry to complete it, the set sizes were reducecl fronr six and two to four and one.
Method
Subiects. Sixteen college students of both sexes participated in a single session of approximately 45 min. All subjects were tested individually; none had participated in the earlier experiment.
Stimuli and, apparatus. The stimuli and aoparatus were identical to that used in Exoeiiment 1.
Procedure. All of the procedural details were identical to those described in Experiment l, with the following exceptions: (a) The rule for positive responses was the same for both letter and dot-pattern stimuli (i.e., respond with the key labeled same if the test slide was the same as one of those presented in the memory set); (b) no new exemplars were presented with the dot-pattern stimuli (i.e., all positive trial stimuli were old exemplars) ; (c) the set sizes were four items and one item; and (d) the trials were arranged in a single block of 48 trials.
One half of the subjects received the letter stimuli as the first stimuli in the session and one half received them as the second. Furthermore, one half of the subjects received a particular dotpattern concept as a one-item memory set and one half received it as a four-item memory set. Al1 subjects received the same groups of letters as one-item arrd four-item menlorv sets.
Rcsults
As in the previous experiment, both accuracy and latency information were recorded, but only the latency data will be discussed because the pattern of errors, sumnrarized in Table 1 , was very sinlilar to the l)attern of RTs.
The mean RTs were detern-rined for each trvo-trial group, representing each successive experience with a particular stimulus set, and these n-reans were analyzed in an analysis of variance with subjects ( 16 levels), stimuli (dot patterns or letters), set size (one or four), and practice (12 levels) as factors. The error term for this analysis was the pooled residual error after the extraction of all main effects and all interactions not involving subjects (MS.: 76,812.18). The results of the analysis were that all four main effects were statistically significarrt: subjects, F(15, 706) =25.7, l) <.0001; stimuli, F(1, 705)=629.88, f < .0001; set size, F(1,705):80.11,2 <.0001; and practice, F(11,705)=76.85, p <.0001. The Stimuli X Practice interaction was also significant, F(11, 705)={./7, I <.0001, but no other interactions among stimuli, set size, or practice were significant. The general patterns of results can be seen illustrated in Figure 3 .
Separate analyses of variance on the letter and dot-pattern stimuli with set size (one and four) and response type (positive and negative) as factors yielded nearly identical results. The effect of set size was significant for letters, F(1, 45) :95.97, p < .0001 (M.t" = 4,375.53), and for dot patterns, F(1, 45) -20.93, p < .0001 (MS.: 29, 415.48) , but neither the factor of response type nor the interaction of response type with set size was significant for either set of stimuli.
Disut,ssion
The results of this experin-rent provide no evidence that only a single generic representation was utilized as the memory representation for perceptual concepts at very early stages of experience with the stimuli. The RT to the four-item memory set was substantially greater than the RT to the one-item memory set for both the letter stimuli (i.e., 752 vs. 590 msec) and the dot-pattern stimuli (i.e., 1,272 vs. 1,076 msec). Moreover, this set size effect was statistically significant with both sets of stimuli and evidently held for positive and negative responses, since the Set Size X Response Type interaction was not significant. The inference from tl-re argunlents presented earlier is that, at this early stage in practice, separate memory rePresentations are maintained and established for each exemplar from the dot-pattern concepts.
Before completely accepting this conclusion, however, it nright be prudent to consicler whether the use of a single-item memory set could have led to some misleading results. With only a single memory set iten-r, there is no need to integrate, assemble, or compile a generic representation, and thus the decisions in the one-itenr nremory set trials might have been based on a memorial representation that differed qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, from the memorial representations utilized in the four-item memory set trials. As a test of this possibility, another experiment was designed with different set sizes.
Experiment 3
This experiment was identical to Experiment 2 except that the memory set sizes were two items and four items rather than one item and four items. Stimuli and apparatu.s. The stimuli and aoparatus were identical to that used in Experimenis 7 and.2.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2 with the exception that the two memory set sizes were four and two.
Results
As in the earlier experiments, both errors and RT were recorded, but only the RT data will be discussed because the trends in the error data were generally similar to those evident in the RT data. The mean error rates are displayed in Table l. The mean RTs for each two-trial group were analyzed in a four-factor (i.e., subjects, stimuli, set size, and practice) analysis of variance with all interactions with subiects pooled as the error term (MS*-49,725:5q. The results of this analysis were identical to those obtained in the previous experir.nent : statistically significant effects of subjects, F(15, 705):22.18, p <.0001; stimuli, F(1, 705):512.33, p ( .0001; set size, F(1, 705)=21.37, p <.0001; prac-
tice, F(11, 705)= t0.07, P < .0001 ; and the Stimuli X Practice interaction, F(11, 705)= 5.36, p < .0001. Again, the interaction of stimuli with set size was not significant nor were any other interactions. However, the set size factor was a significant source of variance in separate analyses on the letter stimuli, F(1, 45)--41.59, p < .0001 (MS" = 3,173.03), and the dot-pattern stimuli, F(1, 45) = 6.43, P < .02 (MS" = 11,376.32). As before, neither the factor of response type (positive or negative) nor the Response Type X Set Size interaction was sig:rificant with either set of stimuli. The general pattefn of results can be seen illustrated in Figure 4 .
Discwssion
The results of this experiment ruie out the possibility that the use of a one-item memory set in Experiment 2 contributed to an artifactual pattern of results. The greater RT to trials with larger memory set sizes was found for both letter stimuli (i.e., 707 vs. 616 msec) and dot-pattern stimuli (i.e., TIMOTHY A. SALTHOUSE 
1,058 vs. 993 msec) in the current experiment with set sizes of four and two. iust as was found in the previous experiment with set sizes of four and one. Evidently, separate memory representations are established for each exemplar from the concept in the earliest stages of experience rvith the dot-patterrr stirrruli.
General Discussion
The overall conclusion from Experiments 1,2, and 3 is that the nature of the memorial representations for perceptual concepts changes rvith increased experience. In ihe initial stages of practice. the dot-pattern concepts are apparently represented in menr_ 9ry by multiple specific exenrplars, as illustrated in Figure la , but la1er, after a n.roderate amount of experience with the stimuli, a single generic representation serves as the concept lnemor\-representation, as illustrated in Figure lb .
The conclusion that a single generic representation is utilized after some experienie with the stimuli is based on the Experiment 1 result of an absence of any difference in IiT between set sizes of six and two for the clot-pattern stimuli, u'hereas quite large differences were evident for the letter stirnuli. The inference that multiple specific representations exist at early stages of experience with the stimuli is based on the similar pat_ tern of larger set sizes leading to longer ItTs for both dot patterns and letters in ihe first 18 to 24 trials of each exDeriment.
Jt is reassurirrg to note thit the silnilar l)attern of results at early stages of experience among the three experiments suggests that the procedural difierences among e*-perirnents were relatively unirnportant. For example, the particular set sizes used in the experiments are apparently not critical, nor is the rule by wliich positive responses for the dot patterns are defined. Addiiional support for the latter inference is the congruent set of results (as evidenced by the a6sence of statistical interactions u-ong exemplar type, set size, and practice) for new and old exemplars in Experiment 1.
It is conceivable that the mechanisnr by lvhich RT u'as increased with an increasl in set size was different for letter stimuli and dot-pattern stimuli. For example, while increasing the number of items in the mem_ ory set might increase the number of mem_ ory representations for conceptually un_ related stimuli such as letteri, it might merely increase the complexity of a single representation or change the nature of the decision process for conceptually related stimuli as dot patterns. From the perspective of changes with experience, however, these alternative explanations appear to be equiva_ lent to the interpretation favored here. In all cases it is possible to make a distinction between the quantity or the quality of the memory representations or the decision process based upon them early in practice, but it becomes impossible to makJ such a distinction later in practice. Therefore, althouSh it might be possible to challenge the specific inference that the number of mimory representations for a concept is reduced with ir-rcreaserl experience, the general conclnsion that something associated with the conceot l,tentory rel,rescntatioz changes with increasecl experience appears indisputable.
Little has been mentioned thus far of the third alternative in Figure l -reflecting the possibility that both a single generic representation and multiple specific represen_ tations might be maintained in memoiy con_ currently. The result that new exenrplars are responded to less rapidly than olcl exenrplars in Experiment 1 might be consirlered to be support for this alternative, since sin-rilar results have been interpreted by other au_ thors as indicating that some specific in_ formation is stored from each exemplar(e.g., lloma, Cross, Cornell, Goldman, & Shwarlr, 1973 ; Peterson et al., l9Z3; posner & Keele. 1968 posner & Keele. . 1970 Strange et at., 1970) . This in_ terpretation, however, seems dependent upon an implicit acceptance of the concept proto_ t1'pe, that is, the pattern from whiih all concept exemplars were derived, as the generic representation. This is not the onlv possibility for the generic representation, since, as was stated earlier, the generic representation could be just about anything, including a most typical exemplar, a feature list, a composite representation, or a proto_ type. The critical attributes of the generic representation seem to be that it be unitary rather than multiple and that it represent the characteristics of the concept effectively enough to allow for equivalence across old (i.e., experienced) exemplars and generalization to new exemplars.
Actually, the possibility that the concept prototype is the generic representation seems unlikely on several grounds. First, as Homa et aL. (1973) have pointed out, it is highly improbable that subjects presented with a limited number of exen.rplars would abstract a central tendency that would be identical to the original prototype. The statistical permutations used to generate the distortecl exemplars seldom exactly balance one another out in a manner such that the average values would be equivalent to the prototype, and even if they did, it is unreasonable to expect the subjects to abstract the precise central tendency without any error.
The seconcl reason for having reservations that the concept prototype is the generic representation is that the evidence previously consiclered to be the strongest in support of the prototype alternative is actually quite equivocal. Several investigators (e.g., Homa et al., 1973; Posner & Keele, 1970; Strange et al., 1970) have reported that the accuracy of classifying prototype stimuli declines less over a period of time than does the accuracy of classifying old exemplar stimuli. Although these authors have emphasized the distinction between the prototype and the old exetnplars, it is important to realize that the prototype stimuli are not unique in maintaining classification accuracy over a time delay, because all new exemplar stimuli exhibit this trend. In other words, the prototype is special when compared to old exemplars but is not in any way unique when con.rpared to new exemplars. By conceptualizing the prototype stimulus as merely another new exemplar stimulus, albeit one of low or no distortion, the meaning of the time delay results is vastly changed, and they can no longer be interpreted as providing direct evidence of the existence of the prototype in memory.
Without the burden of having to assume that the concept prototype is the generic representation, one can take the position that, since the generic representation is based upon the information from the old exemplars, it must necessarily resemble the old exemplars to a greater degree than the never-before-presented new exemplars. This will be the case despite the fact that the old and new exemplars were generated in the same manner from the same original pattern, since all of the exemplars contain slightly different information.l The accuracy ancl latency advantages of old exemplars over new exemplars are therefore explainable as a result of the greater resemblance of tl-re generic representation to old exemplars.
An interesting implication of the argument presented above is that, since the generic representation is constructed from, and indeed based upon, the old exemplar information, it may be impossible to determine rvhether the generic representation exists alone or together with representations o{ specific exemplars. Tl-ris suggests that the alternatives portrayed in Figure 1b and Figure 1c are indistinguishable, at least fronr the perspective of the interpretation favored l.rere.
The important issues concerning the nlemory representations for perceptual concepts appear to center aronncl two basic questions. The first concerns the number of rnemory representations that are maintainecl for perceptual concepts and whether that number changes as a fur-rction of expericnce.
1 A prediction from this interpretation of the generic representation is that the performance difference between old and new exemplars should be directly related to the variability level of the exemplars. The reasoning is that, since the similarity among exemplars decreases as the variability among exemplars increases, the old exemplars (and the generic representation based upon them) will decrease in resemblance to the new exemplars with increasing variability. Empirical evidence in support of this prediction is available in a study by Peterson, Meagher, Chait, and Gillie (1973) . In Experiments \, 2, and 3 oI the Peterson et al. study the performance difference between new and old exemplars of the same level of variability increased as the variability level increased from 1 to S to 7.7 bits per dot.
The second deals with the nature of the information embodied in the generic representation. The experiments of the current study provide an initial answer to the first question; the second awaits further investigation.
